GPS and other satellite navigation signals are jammed and faked across whole regions. We detect it from the position-quality reports that aircraft broadcast, and show where and how often it happens.
flights a day across the Gulf hit by GPS interference after the Iran conflict began in early 2026.
SkAI Data Services, 2026rise in reported GPS spoofing incidents in 2025 compared with 2023. Jamming rose 67%.
IATA Safety Report, 2026ships hit by GPS and AIS interference in the Persian Gulf within a single 24 hours, on 1 March 2026.
Windward, 2026of ship crossings logged through the Strait of Hormuz in August 2026 never happened: they were artefacts of jamming.
Windward, 2026Every coloured hexagon had GNSS interference in the last 7 days. Red marks where it happened most often.
Each event is a group of neighbouring map cells where at least 10% of aircraft, and at least two of them, report degraded satellite positions in the last 10 minutes.
Incidents detected per day over the last 30 days. Today is highlighted.
Satellite signals are extremely weak by the time they reach the ground. That makes them easy to drown out, imitate or replay. These are the ways it happens.
Every GNSS fix comes with an error estimate. When it suddenly grows, something is interfering.
Radio noise on GNSS frequencies drowns the satellite signals, so receivers lose their fix.
Counterfeit satellite signals trick a receiver into computing a false position or time, while it appears healthy.
Real satellite signals are recorded and rebroadcast with a delay, so the receiver works out the wrong place or time.
Any situation where satellite positioning is unavailable or untrustworthy, deliberate or not.
How GNSS works, how to read NIC and NACp, real cases and how operators protect themselves.
Open the guide →Satellite navigation is invisible infrastructure. Much more than maps depends on it: it is also the clock that many systems run on.
Loss of satellite-based approaches, terrain-warning false alerts, and degraded air-traffic surveillance, because ADS-B position reports come from GNSS. Crews must switch to backup navigation, adding workload.
Ships rely on GNSS for navigation and for AIS, the system that shows them to other vessels. Wrong positions raise the risk of collisions and groundings, especially in narrow straits.
Mobile networks, power grids, data centres and financial trading use GNSS as a precise clock. A shifted or lost time signal can disrupt synchronisation far from where the interference happens.
Uncrewed aircraft, autonomous vehicles and agricultural machines depend on GNSS. Spoofing can steer them off course; jamming can force landings or stops.
Fleet tracking, tolling, tachographs and train control use GNSS. Interference creates data gaps and can be used to hide cargo theft.
Caller location, dispatch and search-and-rescue all use satellite positioning. Errors cost time when it matters most.
GNSS interference is not a passing problem. Aircraft lose GPS twice as often as in 2021, hotspots that were rare a few years ago now log disturbances every day, and new regions keep joining the map. Nothing in the technology stops it from spreading further.
GPS signal losses per 1,000 flights. IATA Flight Data eXchange, GNSS Safety Risk Assessment v6 (Feb 2026)
disturbances recorded by air traffic control. Latvijas Gaisa satiksme (LGS), via LSM, Oct 2025
More than 20 ships report false GPS positions; one is shown at an inland airport while drifting over 25 nautical miles away.
US Maritime AdministrationJamming becomes persistent; Latvia goes from 26 recorded disturbances in 2022 to 820 in 2024.
LGS / LSMSpoofing hits civil aircraft at scale; some lose all navigation and drift 70–90 miles off track.
OPSGROUP / FAA alert465 interference and spoofing incidents around Amritsar and Jammu in 15 months.
Government of India, Lok Sabha, Mar 2025Spoofing reported at eight major airports, including Delhi and Mumbai, far from any border.
Government of India, Dec 2025Over 1,100 ships hit in 24 hours; 700+ flights a day affected across the Gulf.
Windward; SkAI Data ServicesIncidents per month and per year, and where they happen most. Hover a bar for exact values.
2026 is year to date.
Aircraft report degraded position accuracy: signals are being drowned out.
Aircraft positions jump to places they could not have flown to: false signals are being transmitted.
Aircraft keep transmitting but lose their position entirely.
Positions collapse toward a nearby point or stop matching speed and heading while accuracy looks normal. ADS-B data alone cannot prove meaconing.
Commercial aircraft broadcast their position about twice a second over ADS-B, together with how accurate it is (NACp) and how far it can be trusted (NIC).
Every report is placed in a hexagonal H3 cell. For each cell we count, over a rolling 10-minute window, how many aircraft report degraded accuracy (NACp below 8 or NIC below 7).
A cell is flagged when at least 10% and at least two of its aircraft are degraded. Neighbouring flagged cells form an incident, which stays open until it has been quiet for 15 minutes.
Limits: we see interference where aircraft fly and where receivers pick them up. Jamming shows clearly; spoofing only when it disturbs accuracy reports. Aircraft that report low accuracy everywhere (faulty equipment) are excluded. Thresholds follow the method published by GPSJAM.
Members see every aircraft on the live map, explore the full incident history, download data as CSV or GeoJSON, and connect their own systems to our API and live feed.